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Most decisions of the Supreme Court that date well back in time enjoy
unquestioned interpretation. Not so Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' decided in
1922. Holmes' opinion for the Court has been the subject of attack from the moment
of its pronouncement. It is the thesis of this Commentary that the critics, on and off
the High Bench, have consistently failed to grasp the genius of Holmes in his
masterful exposition of the constitutional principles that controlled the decision.
Understanding the Holmes opinion would properly place due process considerations
center stage in the jurisprudence of "takings." That two-thirds of a century have now
intervened since this seminal decision is no justification for allowing the matter to
drop. Constitutional issues are never settled until correctly resolved.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pennsylvania Coal presented no complexity on its facts. A deed executed by the
coal company in 1878 had conveyed to the Mahons the surface rights in a plot located
in the city of Scranton, but had expressly reserved the right to remove all coal
underneath. The grantees waived all claims for damages for subsidence that might
arise from mining out the coal. Taking advantage of the savings in cost thereby
realized, the Mahons constructed a residence on the land thus acquired. When mining
operations neared the premises the coal company gave timely notice of its intent to
mine under the house. Thereupon, in reliance on the Kohler Act of 1921,2 the
Mahons instituted an action to prevent mining in such a way as to remove supports
and cause a subsidence of the surface and house. The company's answer was that the
Act, in taking from the company the rights established by the contract, was
unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania courts granted the relief sought, holding the law
to be a legitimate exercise of the State's police power.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Holmes. The
essence of his reasoning was this:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses
are gone.3
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2. The Kohler Act forbade the mining of coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of, inter alia, any structure
used for human habitation. Thus, the legislation destroyed the previously existing contract rights of the defendant
concerning the property. Id. at 412-13.
3. Id. at 413.
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Therefore, "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking" 4 and
invalidated. However, this result will not prevent realization of "a strong public
desire to improve the public condition"; there is always available "the constitutional
way of paying for the change.' 5
II. Two PROJECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL EXEGESIS
The Holmes opinion in Pennsylvania Coal is premised on two fundamental
propositions of constitutional dimension, centering on the due process of law
guaranteed in the fifth amendment against federal breach and in the fourteenth
amendment against similar offense by a state.
The first of these propositions is that the police power inherent in government is
not limitless. The genius of the American Constitution lies in its effective offset of
power and limitation. It is the office of historic due process to determine when an
exercise of government power, whether in the name of the public health, public
morals, public safety, or even the public welfare, has gone to such extreme as to
remove all content from the substance of private property. When this is manifest, the
power of police, to employ Holmes' phrase, has "gone too far." The enactment at
this point is unconstitutional because an unlawful taking has occurred.
Justice Brandeis dissented on one of the few occasions in which he and Justice
Holmes differed in result on a constitutional issue. For Brandeis it was true that
[elvery restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgement
by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. 6
Brandeis' error was his assumption that no exercise of the police power can
constitute a taking that triggers constitutional limitation by operation of due process.
The Justice deduced this erroneous view from the decision in Mugler v. Kansas,7 in
which the elder Justice Harlan, for a unanimous Court, had sustained a state law
forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. The explanation for the
holding was that a "prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit." 8
On its face this statement is not inconsistent with Holmes' thesis, for if the
legislation is a valid exercise of the police power a balance between power and
limitation has been struck and the enactment a fortiori satisfies due process.
However, Justice Harlan gave no indication of such balancing; his use of the modifier
must have been intended only to express his judgment that the law was unquestion-
ably directed at the state's concern with community health, safety, or morals. This
4. Id. at 415.
5. Id. at 416.
6. Id. at 417.
7. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
8. Id. at 668-69.
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concept of validity leaves the police power without limit, save only to provide
protection of property interests where the legislature professes concern for the public
interest as a camouflage for outright attack on the institution of private property. That
Justice Holmes took this view of the passage explains his subsequent remark to
Harold Laski that "I always have thought that old Harlan's decision in Mugler v.
Kansas was pretty fishy."-9
Having been led astray by Harlan's reasoning in Mugler, thereby concluding in
Pennsylvania Coal that there had occurred no unconstitutional taking, Justice
Brandeis was not required to face the consequences of a holding of unlawful taking.
Nor, technically, was Justice Holmes, beyond entering judgment for the coal
company, because the Mahons' claim for relief collapsed with the conclusion that the
Kohler Act, by going too far in its attempted destruction of rights in minerals obtained
by lawful contract, had run afoul of the constitutional limitation pregnant in due
process of law.
However, by referring to "the constitutional way of paying for the change" 10
sought by the Pennsylvania legislature, Justice Holmes made it clear that an offending
government need not subsequently abandon its assault upon proprietary rights but
could opt to pay just compensation to achieve its desire, provided that its objective
comports with the requirement that the contemplated use of the private property thus
obtained be for a public purpose. The "constitutional way" could be a reference only
to the taking clause-express in the fifth amendment along with due process and,
twenty-five years before Pennsylvania Coal, incorporated by reference into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1
The taking proviso in the Constitution is a model of clarity: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' 2 It is solely a
declaration of the condition on which a federal or state government can lawfully
proceed if a decision is made to pursue an objective sought by otherwise invalid
action. Determination that an invalid taking has occurred is the office of the
associated due process clause. This is Justice Holmes' second fundamental proposi-
tion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Due process determines whether there has
been an unconstitutional taking; the taking clause measures the dollar cost to the
public of any adjudged expropriation. There is no indication whatsoever in the
Holmesian synthesis that the taking clause functions to resolve the issue of taking.
Whether government has "gone too far" is a matter to be determined by the
interaction of police power and due process limitation.
The twin insights of the incomparable Holmes make Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon one of the seminal landmarks of the Supreme Court in constitutional
adjudication. They place property due process at center stage in takings jurispru-
dence, where correctly it ought to be. Unfortunately, lesser minds on and off the
Court have failed to grasp the constitutional design unfolded for them by Holmes.
9. 1 Hotmus-I.Asmi LEms 473 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
10. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
11. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
12. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
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Characteristically, those unable to comprehend the design criticize the master rather
than lay the blame at the feet of their own incompetence.1 3 The unhappy result has
been continuing misunderstanding that has not been cleared up in two-thirds of the
century.
Even while Justice Holmes remained on the Court there were signs that other
Justices did not get the message. The case in point was Miller v. Schoene,14
sustaining the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia which empowered the state entomologist to
cut down, within two miles of any apple orchard, all red cedars on private property
either actually or potentially infected with cedar rust "balls." Red cedars were host
to a parasite which in springtime released spores that, carried by the wind, infected
both blossoms and leaves of most varieties of apple trees. The first effect was a
stunting of fruit growth, followed by a killing of the tree by defoliation. Apple
production in the Shenandoah Valley had become a major industry, and losses to
orchardists would put a heavy burden on the economy of Virginia. The Millers, who
owned property within the two-mile limit, challenged the destruction of their
ornamental red cedars as a violation of due process, but lost in the Supreme Court by
a unanimous opinion.
Full analysis of the pertinent facts in this litigation confirms the uniform reaction
of the Justices that, in this case, there was nothing close to an invalid taking in the
uncompensated removal of the offending red cedars; rather, it was one of those
situations where B was only being protected from A, not benefiting at the expense of
A. Virginia's law permitting destruction withstood the charge of invalidity on these
facts.
The opinion, however, was unnecessarily broad. It was written by a newcomer
fresh from a prestigious position in academe, Harlan Stone, who had had no direct
involvement with the underlying issue in Pennsylvania Coal. Possibly, he was
affected by the criticism of Holmes' view that prevailed in the interim among various
erudites; 15 or, he may have been tempted by the propitious occasion to indulge the
common frailty of shallow scholarship. In any event, perhaps, he was too new on the
judicial scene to have plumbed the depths of the constitutional issue presented.
Whatever the explanation, the new Justice topped off the opinion of the Court
with a great flourish: "And where the public interest is involved preferment of that
interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its
destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police
power which affects property."1 6 If the elder Harlan's opinion in Mugler was "pretty
fishy," that of Stone in Schoene was equally so.
13. F. BossEMAN, D. CALLmS, & J. BANTA, THE TAXiNo IsuE chs. 8, 12 (1973). Note especially the odd
explanation of the holding of Pennsylvania Coal attempted by Laurence Tribe, in L. TamE, ArmcAN CONsTrIrtoNAL
LAw 444 (1978).
14. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
15. Dean Acheson had favored the Brandeis position in an unsigned editorial in NEw REPunuc, Jan. 3, 1923, at
136.
16. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (note the qualification: "which affects property.").
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Why did Holmes not concur, countering this veiled assertion that where property
interests are involved the police power is limitless? Did Holmes nod? Surely not.
Rather, he must have felt it was not worth the effort to instruct the Brethren in sound
constitutional principle where decision of the case at bar would not be different for
his endeavor. If any would listen, understanding would be available in his
contemporaneous dissent in Springer v. Philippine Islands.17
Springer involved what was becoming a hotly debated issue concerning
separation of powers under the United States Constitution. The territorial legislative
assembly of the Philippines, in creating a national bank and a national coal company,
vested the voting power of government shares in each enterprise in a committee,
consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of
the House. In an election in which the Governor-General refused to participate, the
other two officers cast their votes. In actions in the nature of quo warranto, the
Governor-General challenged the underlying legislation as unconstitutional under the
Organic Act of the Philippine Islands, which paraphrased the American Constitution
in vesting legislative power in a two-house assembly and executive power in the
Governor-General. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of ouster
entered by the supreme court of the territory.
Justice Holmes, in disagreement, opened his dissent with the following
paragraph that is strikingly reminiscent of his exposition in Mahon as regards the
relationship between police power and due process.
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other. Property must not be taken without compensation,
but with the help of a phrase [the police power], some property may be destroyed for public
use without paying for it, if you do not take too much. When we come to the fundamental
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our
government could not go on.' 8
Holmes then turned to the issue before the Court as involving another instance
of constitutional balance, the relationship among the three departments wielding
governmental power. After reviewing numerous decisions of the Court tolerating
slippage from strict adherence to the separation principle, he concluded
that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide
the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am
far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.19
The conclusion followed that nothing had occurred to justify relief by way of ouster.
It is recorded that Justice Brandeis "agrees with this opinion.'20 This does not
necessarily mean, however, that he agreed with the first paragraph; his agreement
may have been only with Holmes' conclusion with respect to the separation of powers
17. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
18. Id. at 209-10.
19. Id. at 211.
20. Id. at 212.
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issue at hand. Yet he did not so limit himself, nor did he note his concurrence only
in the judgment. There is therefore basis for concluding that Justice Brandeis
recognized the force of Holmes' insight and implicitly recanted the position he had
taken in Pennsylvania Coal. Registering agreement with the Holmes opinion in
Springer, and avoiding any effort to explain his conversion, was the wise course.
Confirmation of this conclusion may be pregnant in two decisions of Justice
Brandeis handed down in the short period during the 1930s after Holmes left the
Court and before Brandeis retired. The decisions concerned congressional morato-
rium legislation known as the Frazier-Lemke Act. As originally enacted the law was
declared unconstitutional by unanimous decision. 21 Curiously, in a long opinion there
is no reference to due process. However, subsequently, in sustainment of an amended
version of the Act22 the Justice declared "that the effect of the [original] statute in its
entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of law." 23
Thus, Justice Brandeis explained the difference between the two statutes-the first
was an instance of federal legislation "going too far," whereas the revision fell short
of running afoul of due process limitation.
Moreover, in his opinion invalidating the Act, Justice Brandeis captures the
Holmes insight that unconstitutionality of enactments does not prevent government
from achieving objectives deemed to be in the public interest:
If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees
in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings
by eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public
interest may be borne by the public. 24
However, a reading of the passage in which this statement appears seems to ground
the finding of a taking in the taking clause rather than, as Justice Holmes foresaw, in
the due process clause. To conclude otherwise would be baseless inasmuch as the
Brandeis invalidating opinion proceeds without mention of due process. Thus Justice
Brandeis, for all his acuity, never fully accepted Holmes' second fundamental
proposition of constitutional design enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.
Four decades elapsed before a factual pattern again demanded, of a Court
"under new management," the consideration of Holmes' two basic constitutional
propositions. The case was San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego,2s in which the
majority avoided decision, dismissing for lack of finality in the judgments of the
California courts. Disagreeing on this technical question of federal jurisdiction,
Justice Brennan for four dissenters faced the utility's claim that there had been a
taking which required just compensation. Asserting that analysis must commence
21. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
22. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
23. Id. at 457.
24. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935).
25. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In San Diego, rezoning by the city of San Diego had thrown into a category of
"open-space" much of a parcel of land the company had bought in anticipation of construction of a nuclear plant. This
category was restricted essentially to parkland hopefully to be purchased with proceeds from a bond issue. The bond issue
had failed to win voter approval, leaving the parcel of no usable value to the company. There ensued a suit in inverse
condemnation brought by the company that alleged a taking of its property without just compensation in violation of the
federal and California constitutions. The remedies sought were damages, mandamus, and declaratory relief.
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with reaffirmance of "Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon," 26 Brennan avoided the verbal trap that had misled Brandeis and
Stone. "[O]nce a court finds that a police power regulation has effected a
'taking,' "27 a remedy is owed to the aggrieved. He had earlier identified due process
as the limiting principle bounding the police power.2 8 He thus demonstrated the
capacity to grasp the first of Holmes' fundamental propositions of constitutional
dimension-that the power of police is not limitless but subject to due process
restraint when government goes too far.
For Justice Brennan the problem in San Diego was the appropriate remedy for
the taking he acknowledged. In Pennsylvania Coal the Court had invalidated the
Kohler Act by invoking the traditional remedy of invalidation for due process taking.
But Justice Brennan reasoned that invalidation for regulatory taking is not always
satisfactory; payment of proper compensation may be essential for effective relief.
The Justice, thus, saw in the constitutional scheme for regulating the police power a
place for due process but only with reference to remedy, not substance; the
constitutional provision for eminent domain was sufficient in itself for the task at
hand.
He missed the Holmes insight on the substantive issue of the relation of the due
process clauses and the taking clause. Holmes' vision was of due process as the
determinant of what constituted a "taking" of private property, just compensation as
the price government must pay if it persists. I lay Brennan's failure to grasp the
functional interplay of due process and taking to senseless refusal of the reconstructed
Court to recognize economic due process as a viable constitutional principle. This
perverseness that denies him insight into the two clauses functioning in tandem, each
fulfilling its unique office in a unitary relationship, is both surprising and disappoint-
ing in light of his grasp of the first Holmesian proposition.
In 1987, the Court returned to the issue of the relationship between police power
and due process. On its facts the litigation in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis29 appeared to be a replay of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. The
Kohler Act had been replaced by the Subsidence Act of 1966 prohibiting bituminous
coal mining which would cause subsidence damage to three classes of surface
structures overlying or in proximity to a mine: public buildings and noncommercial
structures generally used by the public; dwellings used for human habitation; and
cemeteries and public burial grounds. For a bare majority, Justice Stevens sustained
the newer legislation by distinguishing Holmes' invalidation of the earlier anti-
subsidence law of the state.
The basis for distinction was said to be the clear concern of the Pennsylvania
legislature in the Subsidence Act for the health, safety, and general welfare of the
public, whereas the Kohler Act served only private interests and so could not be
sustained as an exercise of the police power. To the Court, this is the key to the
26. Id. at 649.
27. Id. at 658.
28. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 251 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
difference in the two situations-the newer law is within the police power, as though
this finding is ipse dixit determinative of constitutionality. This premise that a
showing of legislative concern for the public interest is sufficient to bring an
enactment within constitutional limits in effect makes the police power limitless. To
the contrary was the insight of Holmes that governmental regulation is within valid
limits only when power has been tested against limitation in the crucible of due
process. The genius of Holmes lay in comprehending that only if, on balance, public
interest legislation does not "go too far" in destruction of private property, it is a
valid exercise of the police power, not a void taking.
The advance in understanding that Brennan had achieved respecting the
relationship of police power and due process was gone amid Keystone's reliance upon
the erroneous perception spawned by Mugler and Schoene. Some hesitancy in
rejecting Holmes' first thesis is apparent from the cautionary statement in the majority
opinion that "we need not rest our decision on this factor alone, because petitioners
have also failed to make a showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test
set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our other regulatory takings cases." ' 30 Full
confidence in their assertion that exercises of the police power can never effect a
taking would not have necessitated resort to a crutch to bolster a holding of
constitutionality.31 One wonders whether the cautionary statement was occasioned by
Justice Brennan referring in Conference to his enlightenment in San Diego.
Later in 1987, came the landmark decision in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.32 On acreage located in Mill
Creek Canyon, purchased in 1957, First Church had developed and operated a
campground, known as Lutherglen, as a retreat center and a recreational area for
handicapped children. Twenty years later a disastrous forest fire denuded the hills
upstream from Lutherglen, followed by flooding in Mill Creek that demolished the
entire project. In response to this flooding the County of Los Angeles adopted an
Interim Ordinance forbidding any construction or reconstruction within designated
boundaries of the Canyon which included the First Church property. The ordinance
was made effective immediately because the county deemed speedy action was
"required for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety . . . . 33
First Church promptly filed a complaint in the California courts, seeking damages on
two counts for the loss of use of Lutherglen.
Amid complicating questions regarding federal jurisdiction and appropriateness
of remedy, a majority of six, including Justice Brennan, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, found a taking which required compensation by the county under
the taking clause as absorbed into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. That the Interim Ordinance was adopted to safeguard "the public health
and safety" did not, in the Court's view, set at naught the Church's claim of an
unlawful taking. For the first time a majority seemed to come close to reaffirming the
30. Id. at 1246.
31. The weakness of the crutch is exposed infra text Part il, in identifying the criteria of taking under due process.
32. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
33. Id. at 2382.
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"established doctrine" of Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal that if a regulation of private
property "goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." This marks significant
advancement in constitutional understanding with respect to the relationship between
police power and due process. The power of police, although broad, is not without
some limit defined by due process.
Disappointingly, an earlier passage in the prevailing opinion prevents an
unqualified assertion that Holmes' position had finally been totally accepted. Left
open is the question "whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a
compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was
insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations." 34 The hedge
seems to be in reaction to an assertion of Justice Stevens, dissenting, with which
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor agreed, that the Court "does not, and could not
under our precedents, hold that the allegations sufficiently alleged a taking or that the
County's effort to preserve life and property could ever constitute a taking. '' 5 This
means that one-third of the Court remains in need of conversion. Misguided
precedents die hard!
The majority opinion in First Church continues in the path of Holmes' reasoning
in Pennsylvania Coal by making explicit what was previously implicit: When a
regulation goes so far as to constitute a taking, thus violating due process, the
offending government has the option either to abandon its untoward assault upon
proprietary rights or to resort to "the constitutional way of paying for the change" 36
provided that change comports with public use. But at this point the Court jumps the
Holmes track by assuming that the constitutional requirement of just compensation
also provides the test of taking. Holmes had seen that the taking clause is but
declaratory of the circumstances in which government can lawfully act if it opts to
proceed rather than abandon its quest., Determination that the regulation in question
constitutes a taking is the function of due process. Because of the continuing
nonsense that economic due process is verboten, the Court fails to grasp the proper
interplay between the due process clause and the taking clause.
The price of Court avoidance of expropriative due process is bad jurisprudence.
The concept of "taking" associated with the taking clause is physical appropriation
of land. Title is transferred; ownership shifts from former private hands to public
domain. The process is known historically as eminent domain. It was semantically
difficult for the Court to extend "taking" to the taking of intangible property rights
in air space.37 Temporary takings presented even greater difficulty.3 8 Indeed, viewed
from perceptions associated with judicial treatment of the taking clause, a temporary
taking is almost a contradiction in terms; there is no permanence in the transaction.
Thus, the Court in First Church is forced to strain at precedent in order to base on the
taking clause its holding that compensation is owing for governmental denial of the
34. Id. at 2384-85. It is noteworthy that Muglar v. Kansas is the earliest of three supporting citations.
35. Id. at 2393.
36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
37. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
38. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373 (1945).
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use of Lutherglen for a period of time. Excessive government regulation, as
contrasted with governmental condemnation, does not fit well under the umbrella of
the taking clause.
How much more unconstrained and compelling would taking decisions be under
due process. In centuries of litigation English and American courts have examined the
principle of expropriative due process in search of its kernel of substantive content.
All manner of legislative "tranfers" from A to B have been subjected to testing for
taking. The test of due process taking resists categorical definition: whether a taking
has occurred must be determined by application of pertinent criteria to the unique
facts of each case. Once again Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon provides the
framework for constitutional clarifications.
II. CRMTRIA OF DUE PROCESS TA, NG
In that seminal decision of 1922 Holmes, disagreeing with Justice Brandeis,
stressed the magnitude of the taking from the Pennsylvania Coal Company to the
benefit of the Mahons by operation of the Kohler Act. In a phrase, "the extent of the
taking is great." 3 9 Yet this emphasis is immediately followed by the statement,
suggesting as well qualitative considerations, that the statute "purports to abolish
what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and
what is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding on the
plaintiffs.'"'4 And pervading the opinion is an emphasis upon the high level of
business ethics displayed by the coal company in its relationship with the Mahons.
Analysis of these qualitative and quantitative factors, separately and then in
combination, determines whether taking in violation of due process has occurred.
A. Quantitative Considerations
The quantitative factor of magnitude can range from alpha to omega. As a
generalization, the less the magnitude of interference or deprivation, the less the
probability of due process taking on quantitative grounds.
1. Zero Taking
Illustrations of zero magnitude readily come to mind. The Court, in Dayton-
Goose Creek Railway v. United States,41 found no unconstitutionality in the recapture
provision of the Transportation Act of 1920 which required that one-half of the
"excess earnings" of the financially stronger railroads be paid over to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for distribution to the weaker railroads in support of their
economic rehabilitation. To the claim of a deprivation of substantive due process by
taking from A (stronger railroad) for the benefit of B (weaker railroad), the Court
39. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
40. Id.
41. 263 U.S. 456 (1924).
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answered in effect that neither complaining carriers nor shippers were the worse off
for the strengthening of the weaker roads to everyone's gain.
Understandably, the Millers in Miller v. Schoene,42 earlier considered, thought
it clear enough that property had been taken unlawfully from them; their ornamental
red cedars had been cut down by the state entomologist. Yet in dollars the fallen
timber was of greater worth than the standing trees, and the land on which they had
grown was more valuable without them. In short, the Millers had been deprived, for
the good of the apple industry of Virginia, only of aesthetic, not monetary, value.
Two instances of no monetary deprivation date from the period of the Great
Depression. Gelfert v. National City Bank43 sustained a New York law that in
application denied a deficiency judgment to a mortgagee who by its bid at foreclosure
sale regained the security for the loan at a market value at least equal to the face
amount of the debt. Shortly thereafter, in Wickard v. Filburn,44 Farmer Filburn was
equally unsuccessful in his claim of an invalid taking where, by virtue of the
operation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, he was "able to market his
wheat at a price 'far above any world price based on the natural reaction of supply and
demand.' "4
Lochner v. New York, 46 invalidating a ten-hour workday limit for bakers, and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital,47 striking down a minimal wage underpinning for
hospital employees, were incorrectly decided. In neither instance was there any
amount of loss to A for B's advantage because, at the levels set, the increased
productivity resulting from the legislation at least equaled the added labor costs of the
employer. This was demonstrated by the "Brandeis Brief" developed by Louis
Brandeis for Oregon's successful challenge of Lochner in Bunting v. Oregon,48 and
continued by Felix Frankfurter in the unsuccessful effort to sustain the District of
Columbia's minimum wage law.
At current federal levels of maximum hours and minimum wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act upheld in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,49 there is a
question whether magnitude of deprivation remains at zero. Occasional talk of a
thirty-hour week and mounting pressure for a major increase in the minimum wage
would surely implicate some reduction in the value of business ownership. It is
contended by opponents that such restricted levels of hours and wages would lead
industry to refuse to offer employment or would force industry to bear heavy labor
costs with no offset save for opportunities to pass along the burden through increased
consumer prices. In such circumstances, justification of factual taking would tend to
shift from the traditional constitutional protection for private property to a reinter-
pretation of the Constitution permitting outright redistribution of wealth and income.
42. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
43. 313 U.S. 221 (1941).
44. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard, the Court sustained, as within the congressional power under the commerce
clause, regulation of the marketing of wheat "overhanging the market" although never moving in interstate commerce.
45. Id. at 131.
46. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
48. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
49. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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With the new constitutionalism now pressed by the radical redistributionists,
quantitative analysis of the magnitude of transfer from A to B becomes irrelevant.
2. De Minimis Taking
Taking in the due process sense does not automatically follow from demonstra-
tion of factual taking. There is the area which Holmes colorfully described as "the
petty larceny of the police power.''50 It is when, to extend the metaphor, grand
larceny is committed that invalidity results. The moratorium cases of the Depression
are instructive. The Minnesota law, sustained in Home Building & Loan Association
v. Blaisdell,5 1 took from the mortgagee's bundle of property rights only that of
immediate repossession after a short period of redemption. Technically the holding
was based on the contract clause, which the minority of four Justices insisted had
been breached. The majority's reasoning sounded in due process terms, highlighting
the flexibility of the due process clause in contrast with the facial absolutism of the
contract clause that would tolerate no impairment of the contract obligation.
One year later the original federal moratorium law was unanimously invalidated
in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.52 Although due process was not cited
as the ground of the decision, the reasoning was again in those terms and the case
later "assigned" to that guaranty. All of the bank's five property rights under
Kentucky law were found to have been transferred to Radford; the taking was one
hundred per cent in magnitude. Congress then revised the law to "return" three of
the five rights in the bank's bundle of sticks.
The new legislation was upheld in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank.53 Treating the rights as equal in weight, magnitude of deprivation had
been reduced by sixty per cent. However, two of the three rights regained by the
mortgagee were of special value, protecting the security for the loan until payment of
the mortgagor's indebtedness. By conservative estimate the statutory amendment
lowered magnitude of deprivation to quite tolerable levels.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.54 recently presented the issue
of low magnitude taking. Loretto was the owner of rental real estate to which a cable
television company had attached its facilities by authority of a New York law. The
installation required one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on Loretto's building.
Although the Court majority conceded that the intrusion was minor, it found that the
permanent physical attachment to the landlord's premises was an unconstitutional
appropriation requiring compensation. The basis of invalidation was the taking clause
as read into the fourteenth amendment.
This time selection of the wrong constitutional provision resulted in a wrong
decision. Clearly, the facts called for application, not of the rigid rule of the taking
clause, but of the flexible principles of fourteenth amendment due process. There was
50. See G. GUMIEER, CONsTTUoNAL LAW 162-67 (10th ed. 1980).
51. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
52. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
53. 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
54. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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a factual taking of sorts, yet nothing approximating expropriation of property
offending due process. The Court was mired in its obsessive avoidance of substantive
due process of law. It is high time for the Justices to return due process to center stage
in takings jurisprudence where it belongs as Justice Holmes had the sagacity to
appreciate.
3. Incomplete Taking
Partial taking is well illustrated by the case of Andrus v. Allard.55 In the district
court, the owners of avian artifacts were successful in their challenge of the Eagle
Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts, which prohibited commercial transactions
in the relics. The basis of invalidation was the violation of fifth amendment property
rights. The Supreme Court reversed:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no
physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed
on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of
property rights the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the
aggregate must be viewed in its entiretyS 6
Admittedly, the right to buy and sell constituted "the most profitable use of
appellees' property." 57 However, the owners retained the "rights to possess and
transport their property," to "donate or devise the protected birds," and to "exhibit
the artifacts for an admissions charge."5 The factual pattern lent itself to analysis
under due process and the argument was so framed in the trial court, but "before this
Court the appellees have used the terminology of the Takings Clause." 59 One can
surmise why counsel for the owners made this shift in strategy; the risk in challenging
closed minds was too great for the litigants. Regrettable, indeed, for this would have
been an excellent occasion for the Court to terminate its senseless resistance to testing
"taking" in terms of due process.
With temporary taking, magnitude seems essentially a function of elapsed time.
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,60 the United States brought eminent domain
proceedings against the laundry company to acquire the right to temporary use and
occupancy of Kimball's plant in order to service military personnel. There was a jury
award for annual rental and damage to plant and machinery beyond ordinary wear and
tear. Kimball sought additional compensation for diminution in the worth of its
business owing to loss of its secret "trade routes." The ouster of some four years'
duration was sufficient to destroy their value. By a five to four vote the Court upheld
the Kimball claim.
55. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
56. Id. at 65-66.
57. Id. at 66.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 64 n.21.
60. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
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In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles,6 1 earlier considered, First Church sought not only the traditional remedy of
invalidation of the ordinance, but also compensation for the period during which use
was forbidden. Los Angeles County had adopted an ordinance for the devastated area
that First Church alleged, and the county did not deny, completely foreclosed the
Church from any use of the property where Lutherglen had stood. The Supreme Court
majority opinion noted:
In the present case the interim ordinance was adopted by the county of Los Angeles in
January 1979, and became effective immediately. Appellant filed suit within a month after
the effective date of the ordinance and yet when the Supreme Court of California denied a
hearing in the case on October 17, 1985, the merits of appellant's claim had yet to be
determined. The United States has been required to pay compensation for lease-hold
interests of shorter duration than this.62
Involved was "a considerable period of years," quite in contrast to "normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and
the like. .... "63 These facts constituted a sufficient magnitude of deprivation for the
majority to find a violation of the taking clause of the fifth amendment as
incorporated into the fourteenth. There was, however, a vigorous dissent.
Thus, instances of both partial taking and temporary taking can range the
quantitative scale from minimal to significant. Whether unconstitutional taking will
be found depends upon a fine-tuned weighing of all pertinent data. For the advocate,
nimble diligence is the price of success. Due process should provide the test.
4. Reciprocated Advantage as a Quantitative Factor
A taking of seeming unconstitutional magnitude quantitatively may on exami-
nation prove to be of de minimis proportions because of the presence of a reciprocity
of advantage as between A, the alleged loser, and B, the alleged beneficiary. The
classic case of New York Central Railroad v. White64 involved the dual question
whether either employee or employer was denied due process of law by legislation
substituting a workmen's compensation system for common law liability based on
fault. The Court concluded that no deprivation of property obtained in either instance
because for each party there was provided an adequate substitute right.
In all likelihood the kernel of the concept of reciprocity of advantage came from
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania.65 Plymouth Coal sustained early legislation
requiring that pillars of coal be left on either side of a property line traversing a mine.
Later in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes, distinguishing Plymouth Coal, said: "That was
a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an
61. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
62. Id. at 2388.
63. Id. at 2389.
64. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
65. 232 U.S. 531 (1914). See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various
laws." 66
The majority in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.67 found a reciprocity of
advantage sufficient to counter a claim of due process deprivation. However, it was
not clear to three dissenters or to Ambler how comprehensive zoning of the entire
village balanced off the financial loss to the realty company from the re-districting of
a portion of its previously acquired land. Here, the realty company, A, did not receive
a direct, certain reciprocal advantage as was true of the employer and employee in
New York Central. Ambler Realty's claimed loss of $7,500 per acre could not be
discounted to any low level of magnitude on the basis of the quantum of advantage
it may have realized from the indirect benefits of comprehensive zoning. The decision
is shaky on its justification.
Reliance on reasoning reminiscent of the concept of reciprocity of advantage
figured in Court validation of the Congressional Joint Resolution of 5 July 1933
nullifying gold clauses in both private and public contracts. Challenge was based on
an asserted violation of due process; the decisions were five to four. In Perry v.
United States,68 involving a Liberty Loan Bond issued by the United States, the
majority saved the national policy by finding that while there had admittedly been a
taking, Perry was entitled to no recoverable damages. The reasoning was that
although the bondholder was forced to accept devalued dollars in payment, he was
enabled to pay his debts in the same currency. I continue in my conclusion that this
time the end was forced to justify the means.
A trio of recent decisions discloses the Court's continued consideration of the
role of reciprocity of advantage in determining magnitude of taking. In the most
recent, Hodel v. Irving,69 the Court found "there is something of an 'average
reciprocity of advantage,' [citing] Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,... to the extent
that owners of escheatable interests maintain a nexus to the Tribe" 70 to which those
interests would pass if the statute were constitutionally firm. This fact would weigh
"weakly in favor of the statute" and combined with the dubious extent to which any
of the owners had "'investment-backed expectations' in passing on the property"
might well result in sustaining the law.7 1 However, these considerations were heavily
overbalanced by the extraordinary character of the government regulation that
weighed in at total magnitude by complete destruction of property interests. Hodel,
like Perry, thus is not helpful in assessing the reciprocity concept as a criterion of due
process taking.
66. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
67. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
68. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
69. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987). In Hodel, the Court considered the validity of § 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983, which provided that certain interests in Indian lands would not descend but instead would escheat to the Tribe
if the interest represented 2% or less of the total acreage in the tract and had earned its owner less than $100 in the
preceding year.
70. Id. at 2083.
71. Id.
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The other two recent cases involved the validity of capping statutes. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group72 concerned the Price-Anderson Act
which capped at $560 million the amount to be allotted per accident to residents living
near atomic power plants should nuclear spill occur. The federal district judge who
heard the case discussed the absence of any quid pro quo to replace extinguished
rights under state tort law. In his judgment no adequate reciprocity was provided by
the statutory proviso that, were nuclear damage to exceed the statutory limit,
Congress "will take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect
the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude.' '73 He found the
federal law invalid as violative of due process of law. However, the Supreme Court
reversed.
The logic of New York Central would seem to apply with renewed force in the context of
this challenge to the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act not only provides a
reasonable, prompt, and equitable mechanism for compensating victims of a catastrophic
nuclear accident, it also guarantees a level of net compensation generally exceeding that
recoverable in private litigation. 74
A brave statement, indeed, but the asserted quid pro quo offers nowhere near the
certainty of reciprocated advantage on which New York Central rests. Government
advocates in future litigation would be wise not to rely on the "logic" of Duke Power
in contending that challenged taking is minimal in magnitude by reason of the
presence of reciprocity of advantage. The argument's vulnerability lies in the
assumed low level of recovery in private litigation and the uncertainty of requisite
congressional action.
In the other capping case, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,75 the Court
summarily rejected examination of the reciprocity-of-advantage criterion of due
process taking by dismissing appeal from the Supreme Court of California "for want
of a substantial federal question.''76 Surely Justice White, dissenting alone, was
correct that a substantial constitutional issue was presented. 77 The other Justices knew
better; they used this ploy to delay judgment. Perhaps postponement on the merits
was wise. State court litigation is perplexing on the question whether preservation of
the tort system for recovery of damages for personal injury can offer a meaningful
quidpro quo for taking, from one injured through the fault of another, a portion of the
noneconomic loss awarded in a jury verdict.
The dollar level of a cap, the percentage of the cutback, the relative permanence
of the injury, and other considerations necessarily affect the adequacy of the
reciprocity. Again under the capping statutes, A is not assured of that direct and
certain reciprocal advantage A had with B in New York Central. Reciprocity of
72. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
73. Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.N.C.
1977).
74. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978).
75. 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 895.
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advantage is a slippery concept among the quantitative criteria for testing taking by
due process standards.
5. Total Deprivation
The clearest instance of quantitative "total taking" is presented where a
legislature declares that property theretofore in fee simple ownership of A is by fiat
declared to be the property of B. Bowman v. Middleton78 denounced such an
enactment as "against common right, as well as against magna charta." Similar
determinations invoking state due process of law clauses followed up to the eve of the
Civil War. The Supreme Court of the United States in three post-Civil War cases
unequivocally declared that such an attempted transfer of title constituted a violation
of due process of law. 79 Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford8o had held
violative of due process Section 8 of the Missouri Compromise because it effected a
complete transfer of ownership of chattel property. However, repudiation of the
holding by ratification of the fourteenth amendment robs the case of weight.
There are two recent instances of unquestioned total magnitude taking. The earlier
is Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith. 81 There the clerk of a county court,
relying on a combination of statute and judicial decree, claimed ownership of the
interest on more than $100,000 that had been paid into the court registry pursuant to
an interpleader action. The Court held that these monies belonged to the creditors of
Fabulous Pharmacies, not to the county. The judgment was nullification of the state
action, the traditional remedy for a due process taking. Resting the decision on the
taking clause, the Justices continued the nonsense of avoiding dependence on the due
process clause in adjudication of alleged deprivation of property rights.
In the more recent Supreme Court decision of Hodel v. Irving,82 there is no
confession of error in failing to use due process and, yet, there is a glimmer of hope.
The legislative enactment that "effectively abolishes both descent and devise" 83 of
certain fractionated interests in land was forthwith declared to be in violation of the
fifth amendment. The O'Connor opinion, from which there is no dissent, notes the
absence of compensation but it closes by recalling Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania
Coal that regulations which "go too far" constitute a deprivation of due process of
law. That the escheat provision amounted to a taking of total magnitude was
unquestioned. One could hope that due process analysis is moving toward center
stage in the context of total deprivation.
The determination of whether total quantitative taking has occurred can be
difficult. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis84 presented the
problem in the face of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. The crutch employed by the
78. 1 Bay 252 (C.P.S.C. 1792).
79. Dictum in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), flowered
into a holding at the end of the century in Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
80. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
81. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
82. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
83. Id. at 2083.
84. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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bare majority to uphold the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act was the assertedly slight
diminution in value effected by the legislative transfer from the mine operators to the
owners of surface interests. "The parties have stipulated that enforcement of the
DER's [administrative agency's] 50 percent rule will require petitioners to leave
approximately 27 million tons of coal in place'85 out of a total of over 1.46 billion
tons, or "less than 2 percent." '8 6 Precedent abounds for the proposition that minor
appropriations do not require compensation; Holmes' metaphor about the "petty
larceny of the police power" could have been invoked in support. Thus, asserts the
majority, "Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case" 87 because its finding had
been "that the Kohler Act made mining of 'certain coal' commercially imprac-
ticable";8 whereas in Keystone "it is plain that the petitioners have not come close
to satisfying their burden of proving that they have been denied the economically
viable use of that property. "89
But here's the rub! In Pennsylvania Coal the pillar coal was the unit of property
against which the quantum of taking was measured; inasmuch as the totality of this
quantity was denied to the Company the expropriation was total-an invalid taking
could be constitutionalized only by the government compensating the owners of the
mineral rights. In 1987, the Keystone majority insisted that there "is no basis for
treating the less than two percent of petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of
property" 90 because the basis for measuring the quantum of taking consists of the
owners' total "coal interests in western Pennsylvania. '" 91 Thz reasonable interpre-
tation of Holmes' reference to mining coal "with profit" is that he was thinking of
the pillar coal, the extraction of which the Kohler Act made "commercially
impracticable," thus having "very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it. '"92 But the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Keystone misconstrued the passage and thereby misguided the Supreme Court.
The misconstruction is found in footnote six of the Court of Appeals' opinion9
3
and quoted with approval in the prevailing opinion in Keystone:
At first blush, this language seems to suggest that the Court [in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon]
would have found a taking no matter how little of the defendants' coal was rendered
unmineable-that because "certain" coal was no longer accessible, there had been a taking
of that coal. However, when one reads the sentence in context, it becomes clear that the
[Pennsylvania Coal] Court's concern was with whether the defendants' "right to mine coal
... [could] be exercised with profit." (emphasis added)... Thus, the Court's holding in
Mahon must be assumed to have been based on its understanding that the Kohler Act rendered
the business of mining coal unprofitable. Plaintiffs do not contend that this is the case here.-
85. Id. at 1249.
86. Id. at 1248.
87. Id. at 1240.
88. Id. at 1246.
89. Id. at 1249.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1248.
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
93. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1985).
94. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1249 (1987) (quoting Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 716 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court omitted the Court of Appeals' citation of Plymouth Coal Co.
v. Pennsylvania,95 which Holmes distinguished. In Plymouth Coal a requirement that
pillars of coal be left in place was held not to constitute an invalid taking because the
applicable law required leaving only "a comparatively small portion of the valuable
contents of the vein .... 96
Plymouth Coal does not support the assertion that Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
limited unconstitutional taking to instances of unprofitability in the total operations of
mine owners. Plymouth Coal was a different type of case, where separate owners of
mines on each side of a property line were required to leave boundary pillars of
sufficient width to prevent the closing of one of the mines from flooding the other that
remained in production. The enactment was clearly designed to protect "the safety of
the men employed in mining upon either property." 97 Plymouth Coal conceded that
in these circumstances the statutory requirement could not be deemed an unreason-
able exercise of the police power.
As the minority said, Pennsylvania Coal cannot be successfully distinguished
from Keystone. All the pillar coal was taken in Pennsylvania Coal, not profitability
in toto. By Holmes' standard Keystone involved a magnitude of taking, equal to that
of the pillar coal, that should have been declared violative of due process of law.
Justice Powell's retirement would make no difference in a replay of Keystone; he was
one of the four dissenters. Only when Justice White realizes on reflection the fallacy
gripping the majority can the error of Keystone be rectified.
B. Qualitative Considerations
In the determination of valid or void "taking," quantitative criteria alone are not
determinative; qualitative criteria as well require evaluation. Here again the range can
be from alpha to omega.
1. Economic Interest or Property Right
The initial question is whether there exists a property right at all. The difficulty
of that ascertainment is disclosed in United States v. Willow River Power Co.,98
wherein Chief Justice Stone and Justice Roberts were in disagreement with a majority
for whom Justice Jackson spoke. The power company owned land at the mouth of
Willow River where it drained into the St. Croix River, a navigable stream. On a site
riparian to the St. Croix, the company had erected a hydroelectric plant which
provided power to the neighboring area. The United States then constructed the Red
Wing Dam on the upper Mississippi, into which the St. Croix flows. The dam caused
water to back up into the St. Croix beyond the plant, materially reducing the head of
water and thus diminishing the plant's capacity to produce electricity. This forced the
95. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
96. Id. at 540.
97. Id.
98. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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company to supplement its production by purchase from other power sources; for this
taking the company demanded just compensation.
The Court majority rejected the claim which had been allowed by the Court of
Claims. Declared the majority:
It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value and that the Company has an economic
interest in keeping the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all economic interests are
"property rights"; only those economic advantages are "rights" which have the law back
of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from
interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion. The law long has recognized that
the right of ownership in land may carry with it a legal right to enjoy some benefits from
adjacent waters. But that a closed catalogue of abstract and absolute "property rights" in
water hovers over a given piece of shore land, good against all the world, is not in this day
a permissible assumption. We cannot start the process of decision by calling such a claim as
we have here a "property right"; whether it is a property right is really the question to be
answered.99
Willow River was decided on the taking clause of the fifth amendment; however,
the distinction it drew between "economic interest" and "property right" would
seem equally applicable to due process "taking." Thus, in the same year as Willow
River, Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, °0 involved a claim of due process
violation on the part of a defendant disadvantaged by legislation liffing the bar of a
statute of limitations in pending litigation. Suit was to recover for fraud in a securities
transaction.
Reaffmning Campbell v. Holt,101 the Court denied relief. Did defendant have
only an economic interest in preventing extension of the period of limitation, or did
he have a property right of such dubious quality as not to merit protection? Perhaps
it was the latter. This inference could be drawn from the fact that Campbell had been
limited to instances "where lapse of time has not invested a party to title to real or
personal property." 02 At the least it is clear that, within the category of "property
rights," the Court is sensitive to the quality of the right as well as to the quantitative
factor of magnitude in "taking" questions.
Chase Securities is reminiscent of the early case of Calder v. Bull,10 3 where the
continuing issue of the proper role of the Supreme Court in exercising the power to
determine constitutionality was first debated by Justices Chase and Iredell.104 There
a probate court had refused to admit a will to probate, thus entitling the heir to take
by intestacy. However, after the time for appeal had expired, a special legislative act
granted a new hearing, at which the court of probate reversed its original ruling. Thus
done in, the heir cried foul. On review by the Supreme Court, Justice Chase was
sorely tempted to grant relief despite the absence of a constitutional base for so doing.
99. Id. at 502-03.
100. 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
101. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
102. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311 (1945) (summarizing the holding of Campbell v. Holt, 115
U.S. 620 (1885)).
103. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
104. See F. Strong, Fundamental Law and the Supreme Court, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AmERiCAN CONsTMrUtION
827 (1986).
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"A law ... that takes property from A and gives it to B: it is against all reason and
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers: and, therefore, it
cannot be presumed that they have done it." 105
In the end, Chase withstood the temptation, partly because of Iredell's strong
caution against invalidation beyond constitutional limit and also because of hesitancy
respecting the quality of the heir's claim. Although the size of the estate is not known,
the heir clearly had an economic interest in the outcome of the probate proceedings.
But more, under the distinction made in Willow River he had a property right by
reason of the Connecticut laws of inheritance, which supported Chase. Yet at the
same time the right lacked substantiality, which would account for Chase's hesitancy.
2. Expectations as a Property Right
There are other instances where more than economic interest obtains but,
although a factual taking of the property right is present, it does not rise to the level
of an unconstitutional taking by reason of infirmity in the quality of the right.
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park'° 6 is illustrative. There the Court
upheld a New Jersey law providing for composition of the debts of municipalities
unable to meet their indebtedness because of economic conditions in the Great
Depression. The claims of bondholders unhappy with the terms of the law were
referred to as "paper rights." Quantitatively, the impact on the bondholders cut
deeply into their security, yet given the circumstances the state action was a major
thrust of little substance.
A better founded expectation was involved in El Paso v. Simmons,10 7 which
grew out of Texas' major distribution of public land to private ownership. Under the
original program, contracts of purchase called for a small down payment and annual
payment of interest and principal, and for forfeiture on nonpayment of interest, but
for reinstatement of the defaulting purchaser at any time upon payment of delinquent
interest provided there were no intervening rights of third parties. However, with
discovery of great deposits of oil and gas in Texas, the unlimited reinstatement rights
made speculation in land ownership and much litigation inevitable. The result was an
"imbroglio over land titles in Texas." o108 In an effort to remedy the situation the
legislature amended the law to reduce to five years from date of forfeiture the
reinstatement provision that had been without limit in duration.
The amendment was upheld. Constitutionality was formally predicated on the
contract clause but reasoned on the basis of due process. The entire operation was a
speculative enterprise in landholding with profits realized by purchasers in the nature
of a windfall. But as Justice Black insisted in his lone dissent, contract rights had
been adversely affected. The decision appeared to turn on the majority's assertion
that the promise of long-deferred reinstatement "was not the central undertaking of
105. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
106. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
107. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
108. Id. at 513.
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the seller nor the primary consideration for the buyer's undertaking."' 109 Quite
understandably, Justice Black found this assertion completely at odds with common
knowledge concerning credit buying and selling; the case was much closer on the
facts than suggested by the disparity in the voting among the Justices.
In the above decisions the inherent weakness in the quality of the claimed
property right lay in the fact that the claimants were attempting to build a case out of
dashed expectations. Calder v. Bull and Chase Securities were especially clear
examples: The claims were quite ethereal; on any examination they had little body to
them. A further instance of similar import is found in Market Street Railway v.
California Railroad Commission.10 The private street railway company, forced into
unprofitability by competition from the city's car lines, complained of the price set
for sale of the private lines to San Francisco. The Court was unimpressed with the
complaint. "The due process clause has been applied to prevent governmental
destruction of existing economic values. It has not and cannot be applied to insure
values or to restore values that have been lost by the operation of economic
forces." ' Frequently in recent Court opinions there is reference to "reasonable
expectations" in testing for the presence or absence of invalid taking." 2
Contrary results in the two air space cases, if explainable at all, must reflect
Court differentiation between expectations of future value and property interests that
have somehow, in the eyes of legal contemplation, been reduced to possession. Is A's
right yet in embryo or has it by some alchemy been transformed into a vested interest?
In United States v. Causby,l13 a case of first impression, 14 the facts were that Causby
had developed on his small acreage a commercially successful chicken farm. This
operation had been destroyed by the repeated incoming and outgoing of military
planes based at the Greensboro Airport; the chickens had persisted in dying from
fright. The untoward experience served to give substance to Causby's asserted rights
in the air space immediately above his land. The Court reasoned that "an easement
of flight was taken,""l 5 requiring compensation.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City," 6 the owners of Grand
Central Terminal assumed rights of ownership in the air space above. However, no
action on that assumption had ensued until a lease to Union General Properties was
executed for construction of a multi-story office building over the terminal. But by
that time the terminal had been designated a "landmark" under the city's Landmarks
Preservation Law, and the commission created by that legislation rejected plans for
the project. The Court split six to three, denying relief. Technically, it based decision
on the taking clause, yet both majority and dissent argued a mixture of due process
109. Id. at 514.
110. 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
111. Id. at 567.
112. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Light & Power Co., 459 U.S. 400,416 (1983) ("In short,
ERG's reasonable expectations have not been impaired by the Kansas Act."); contra, Kaiser Aetna Co. v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) ("expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property' ").
113. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 261-62.
116. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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and eminent domain precedents. Once again a claim of property right grounded only
on a fragile assumption was rejected for its poor quality. Lacking were the
investment-backed expectations present in Causby.
3. Interparty Relationship as a Qualitative Factor
The relationship between A and B has a bearing on the quality of A's claim that
a property right of A's has been given to B. This elusive factor has overtones in
nuisance, tort, unjust enrichment, and other colorings from private law. In some
relationships, fault can be seen in A's conduct; in others, A's behavior can be without
blemish insofar at least as B is concerned. The classic illustration of quite different
relationships between the parties, having undoubted consequences in judicial
reaction, is found in comparison of Pennsylvania Coal and Schoene. In the former,
the facts showed exemplary conduct on the part of the Coal Company in its dealings
with the Mahons. In the latter, there was an offensive aspect to the Millers' conduct
in hosting in their red cedar trees the cedar rust "balls" that in springtime would
release the spores so destructive to nearby apple trees and their fruit. Although the
great difference in the magnitude of the taking in the two situations was enough to
result in opposite holdings on constitutionality, nevertheless the sharp contrast in the
relationship of the parties must have served to clinch the contrary results.
A was tarred with far greater offensiveness in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish. 1 1 7 The hotel was said to be morally derelict in paying chambermaids wages
below cost-of-living levels. Such employers were characterized as unconscionable in
forcing taxpayers to make up the difference because the "bare cost of living must be
met." " 8 A was at fault and B was receiving only what was rightfully due.
In contrast is Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 9 a unanimous
decision of unconstitutionality announced shortly before Parrish. There Texas, first
by statute and, that failing, then by administrative action, had attempted in certain
circumstances to force vertically integrated oil companies to allow use of their
pipelines by non-integrated independent producers. The result would have been to
deny A the right to pump its own requirements to meet advantageous marketing
contracts. Positing a regime of competitive capitalism, this was rank stealing from A,
whose only "offense" was that of engaging in free enterprise. Declared none other
than Justice Brandeis: "Our law reports present no more glaring instance of the taking
of one man's property and giving it to another."' 120
How different two consecutive terms of the Court can sometimes be! The very
next year, New York City's tax on local public utilities was before the Court on a
claim of due process deprivation. The proceeds of this tax were to be devoted to
reduction in the hardships of Depression unemployment. No evidence was offered
that the privately owned utilities were peculiarly to blame for the Great Depression;
why saddle them with a heavy tax burden that in all fairness should be borne by all
117. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
118. Id. at 399.
119. 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
120. Id. at 79.
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taxpayers? Notwithstanding, the enactment was upheld in New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. City of New York.12 1
Once the Court found no denial of equal protection, the due process contention
was disposed of quite summarily. Justice Brandeis was a member of the majority,
thus signaling that he saw a difference in the quality of the property right in the two
cases. Seemingly, the explanation lay in the fact that New York City had exercised
its taxing power, not its police power. A split Court in Carmichael v. Southern Coal
Co. 122 had just sustained an Alabama excise tax on private employers to support a
state unemployment insurance program. Rejection in Carmichael of the insistence
that the state law "takes private property from one class for the use of another' 123
was based essentially on the proposition that want of relationship between the
subjects and benefits of a tax is not a valid objection to a tax levied for a public
purpose.
Such is a given of the unique power to tax, a power essential to providing
life-giving "blood" to the body politic. Recall Citizens' Loan Association v.
Topeka,124 which suggests that this attribute of the taxing power may attach
particularly to public utilities. By implication Loan Association indicated no
invalidity in imposing taxation for the aid of public utilities because of their
uniqueness as part private, part public corporations.
Any possibility that the immateriality of lack of relationship would be restricted
to exercises of the taxing power was shattered by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri'25 and Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp.126 Not only was state
police power the basis of constitutionality, but further, A's obligation of community
service was not the direct one of paying taxes but the vicarious one of financing the
civic duties of the B's employed by A.
No wonder Justice Jackson felt in Day-Brite that the limit had been passed by
this judicial approval of a shifting of economic burden on flimsy, far-fetched
mesmerism. The only explanation of these validations is a socialistic one akin to the
dogmatism of the distributionists who would alter minimum wage legislation into a
vehicle for progress in their goal of major equalization of wealth and income. In such
a milieu, attention to the quality of A's property right in relationship to B is
irrelevant.
121. 303 U.S. 573 (1938).
122. 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
123. Id. at 499.
124. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874). In Loan Association, the Court declared taxation for the aid of a private
enterprise illegal.
125. 342 U.S. 421 (1952). Day-Brite held valid a law requiring an employer to pay employees during released time
for voting.
126. 412 U.S. 543 (1973). The Court in Dean sustained a law requiring employers to pay employees during jury
service.
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4. Vested Interests as Top Quality Property Rights
It is apparent that property rights can vary widely in quality from the very flimsy
to the very substantial. Illustrative of the latter are contract rights, which despite the
tenuousness of the contract clause since 1880, rank high qualitatively in the judicial
mind. Two decisions of the late 1970s, although by divided vote, disclose the
continued strength of contract-based rights. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 27
held invalid the repeal of a legislative covenant that proceeds of bonds of the Port of
New York Authority issued to finance two specified programs would not be diverted
to the support of mass transit. In addition, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus 28 held
constitutionally wanting Minnesota legislation that impaired contractual relationships
between the company and its employees with respect to a pension benefits plan. Both
decisions were awkwardly based on the contract clause. In the latter decision, Justice
Brennan insisted in dissent that the issue should have been determined on due process
with opposite result.129
Through centuries of English and American legal history, rights in land have
exceeded even contract rights on the qualitative scale. There are no values the equal
of that bundle of strands that constitutes fee simple title to land. One of the Court's
latest pronouncements, Hodel v. Irving,130 confirmed this verity. Not only did all
Justices find total taking quantitatively in abolition of both descent and devise of
lands of Indian ownership, as has been noted; of equal determinativeness was the fact
that "the right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of
the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times."'131
IV. DUE PRocEss REmAINs FAR FRoM CENTER STAGE
On the last day of the Court's 1986 Term, the overweening event was Justice
Powell's surprise announcement of his retirement from active service. Only the Chief
Justice had any foreknowledge; the other seven were taken unaware. As consistent
swing Justice, unparalleled since the days of Justice Roberts fifty years before,
Powell's decision could be seen as disappointing to both conservative and liberal
wings of the Court. However, the greater shock had to be to the latter, for with the
President's demonstrated determination to name conservative Justices, the loss of
Justice Powell meant the breakup of the group of five, the others of whom give every
indication of an attempt to hold on through the end of the Reagan presidency.
Significantly, Justice Powell gave those four no opportunity to persuade him to
reconsider; his concern was for history's record of his service to the Court, not for
perpetuation of a controlling philosophy on the Court.
127. 431 U.S. 1(1977).
128. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
129. Id. at 251.
130. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
131. Id. at 2083.
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There was, as well, irony for the liberal Justices on this fateful occasion; they
lost Justice Powell to the conservative wing, suffering defeat on a vote of five to four.
The case was Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.132 The Nollans had leased
beach-front property, on which stood a bungalow, with an option to purchase.
Shoreward, the lot extended beyond an eight-foot concrete seawall to the historic
mean high tide line. To exercise the option the Nollans were required to replace the
bungalow with a three bedroom, two-story standard house. For permission thus to
rebuild, the Coastal Commission imposed a condition: the grant of a public easement
"to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line on one
side and the seawall on the other side."' 133 This lateral passage over the beach portion
of the Nollan property would connect with two public beach areas, one a quarter mile
to the north and the other one-third mile to the south. The Nollans brought mandamus
to strike the condition as violative of the taking clause incorporated from the fifth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment. The Commission resisted.
Nothing said by the Court in Nollan advances property due process toward
center stage, where it belongs. There were four opinions: that of Justice Scalia for the
prevailing five Justices, that of Justices Brennan and Marshall in the leading dissent,
the short dissent by Justice Blackmun alone, and the dissent of Justice Stevens in
which Justice Blackmun joined. The result is that the Court's understanding of
Holmes remained muddleheaded.
Analysis best commences with the vigorous dissent of Justice Brennan. The key
to the Brennan position is found in the short paragraph opening Part II: "The fact that
the Commission's action is a legitimate exercise of the police power does not, of
course, insulate it from a takings challenge, for when 'regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon ..... 134 Here the
Justice reiterates his acceptance of Holmes' thesis that the power of police is not
limitless. Indeed, he outdoes Holmes by modifying "police power" with the
adjective "legitimate." Technically, legitimate police power is police power as
bounded by due process and thus, without more, fully "insulated" against invalidity.
But note the next and concluding sentence of the paragraph: "Conventional
takings analysis underscores the implausibility of the Court's holding, for it
demonstrates that the exercise of California's police power implicates none of the
concerns that underlie our takings jurisprudence."1 35 Essentially, the Justice insists
there is no unconstitutional taking of the Nollans' property. Granted that it is
consistent with the position that police power is limited to find on given facts that no
"taking" has occurred. Nevertheless, questionable support for such a finding raises
doubt whether the major premise is resolutely held.
132. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
133. Id. at 3143.
134. Id. at 3156.
135. Id.
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It must have been such doubt that provoked Justice Stevens to say: "I like the
hat that Justice Brennan has donned today better than the one he wore in San Diego,
and I am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments here." 136 In this
view, Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Blackmun, who in his own dissent had
muddied the legal waters by declaring that "[t]he governmental action is a valid
exercise of the police power, and, so far as the record reveals, has a nonexistent
economic effect on the value of appellants' property." 1 3 7 In the final footnote at the
very end of his opinion, Justice Brennan sought to reconcile his Nollan dissent with
his position in First Church where his proposed constitutional rule announced in San
Diego was endorsed by six members of the Court.1 38
On examination of Justice Brennan's analysis, his conclusion "that the State has
taken no property from appellants"' 139 rested on three propositions. These are, in
apparent ascending order of significance, (1) reciprocity of advantage to the Nollans
in return for the lateral public access across their beachfront; (2) lack of any
reasonable expectation on the part of the Nollans of use of their property exclusively
for private purposes; and (3) the presence of a reasonable relationship between the
permit condition and land-use regulation in the interest of the public.
Reciprocity of advantage receives a paragraph of treatment by the Justice.
"Allowing appellants to intensify development along the coast in exchange for
ensuring public access to the ocean is a classic instance of government action that
produces a 'reciprocity of advantage.' Pennsylvania Coal. . . . " 140 But this statement
is deceptive in suggesting that Holmes there found any reciprocity of advantage. His
reference was to "an average reciprocity of advantage" in the fact pattern of
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, which he distinguished in Pennsylvania Coal.
For Holmes the concept was applicable only in the presence of a direct, in-kind
reciprocal, as in Plymouth Coal, New York Central, and (less closely) Ambler Realty.
Since Holmes' time the reciprocity concept has experienced some broadening.
Thus in Hodel Justice O'Connor saw "something of an 'average reciprocity of
advantage'" yet, because the nexus to the Tribe was at best indirect, she found it
"weighing weakly in favor of the statute" and heavily outweighed by the magnitude
of the intrusion upon property rights. 141 Perry and Duke Power are probably best
understood as instances where the enormous cost of invalidation to the federal
government determined the outcome, and yet, even in those cases, the reciprocal was
less faint than in Nollan. Justice Brennan went far afield indeed when he found "an
additional benefit from the Commission's permit condition program"' 142 in the fact
that the appellants "are able to walk along the beach beyond the confines of their own
136. Id. at 3163.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3162 n.14.
139. Id. at 3160.
140. Id. at 3158.
141. 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (1987).
142. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3158 (1987).
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property only because the Commission has required deed restrictions as a condition
of approving other new beach developments. ' 143
Treatment of expectation appears at two points in Brennan's dissent. Near the
end of Part IA, he observed:
Where a private landowner has had a reasonable expectation that his or her property will be
used for exclusively private purposes, the disruption of this expectation dictates that the
government pay if it wishes the property to be used for a public purpose. In this case,
however, the State has sought to protect public expectations of access from disruption by
private land use.-"
Later, in Part II, Justice Brennan declared:
With respect to appellants' investment-backed expectations, appellants can make no
reasonable claim to any expectation of being able to exclude members of the public from
crossing the edge of their property to gain access to the ocean. It is axiomatic, of course, that
state law is the source of those strands that constitute a property owner's bundle of property
rights. 4
As a criterion of "taking," expectation is of doubtful weight unless investment-
backed. In this case Justice Brennan insists there is no basis whatever even for
expectation because of a provision in the California Constitution of 1879. That
provision "explicitly states that no one possessing the 'frontage' of any 'navigable
water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water
whenever it is required for any public purpose.' ,46 It is therefore the public's
expectations that are "settled" which the private landowners threaten to disrupt.
However, the Brennan contention holds true only if the state constitutional
provision can be construed to embrace lateral access to water. Such construction is
highly questionable in light of the wording. A public right to the water, taken in
historical context, is strongly suggestive of direct access to water from landlocked
parcels of property, absent authoritative state-court interpretation. Justice Scalia for
the majority is on sound ground in challenging the doubtful reading. Of "a number
of difficulties with [Brennan's] argument," the most obvious is that "the right of way
sought here is not naturally described as one to navigable water (from the street to the
sea) but along it; it is at least highly questionable whether the text of the California
Constitution has any prima facie application to the situation before us."1 47
Part I of the Brennan dissent opens and closes on the issue of relationship.
However, in contrast with the personalized character of relationship, or lack thereof,
between A and B seen in earlier cases considered in Section I, nexus here is debated
in terms of connection between the permit condition and public access, visual and
psychological, to the ocean. This stance is found in two passages:
Appellant's proposed development would reduce public access by restricting visual access
to the beach, by contributing to an increased need for community facilities, and by moving
143. Id.
144. Id. at 3154.
145. Id. at 3158.
146. Id. at 3158-59.
147. Id. at 3145.
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private development closer to public beach property. The Commission sought to offset this
diminution in access, and thereby preserve the overall balance of access, by requesting a
deed restriction that would ensure "lateral" access [enabling the public to pass and repass
along the dry sand parallel to the shoreline].' 48
Citing Day-Brite Lighting, and two other precedents of like extreme, Justice
Brennan then insisted that the connection need be only rational. Applying this low
level nexus, which experience with the facile term means little short of no
relationship at all, he insisted:
[t]he Court is therefore simply wrong that there is no reasonable relationship between the
permit condition and the specific type of burden on public access created by the appellants'
proposed development. Even were the Court desirous of assuming the added responsibility
of closely monitoring the regulation of development along the California coast, this record
reveals rational public action by any conceivable standard.'49
It must have been the tenuousness of these propositions, individually and in
combination, that led Justices Stevens and Blackmun to wonder if Brennan had not
in effect retracted from his thesis, articulated in San Diego and adhered to in First
Church, that state police power is subject to constitutional limitation protective of
rights in private property. If Justice Brennan has slipped back from the high ground
he had attained, Holmes' thesis of a bounded police power continues in serious
jeopardy.
For the majority Justice Scalia rejected Justice Brennan's primary argument on
relationship. "Rewriting" it "to eliminate the play on words makes clear that there
is nothing to it." 150 Continuing,
[]t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public
beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches or how it helps to remedy any additional
congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that
the Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its
land use power for any of these purposes.'-"
The new Justice took comfort in the fact, citing endless state cases, that his
conclusion was consistent with that of all other courts, save those of California.
However, Justice Scalia disputed only the application of the rational basis test;
he did not challenge outright the flimsy standard itself. Rather, he contended that the
criteria for "taking" under the taking clause differ from those applicable with the due
process clauses. "But there is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases
gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue
the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection
challenges are identical .... -,152 The accuracy of this statement is open to question;
there has been a Court tendency to cross cite, not categorize, holdings, as Penn
148. Id. at 3152.
149. Id. at 3156.
150. Id. at 3149.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3147 n.3.
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Central153 amply attests. Moreover, the distinction is unfortunate on at least two
counts.
First, determining taking by reference to the taking clause introduces an
undesirable rigidity into takings jurisprudence. Because eminent domain historically
connotes physical expropriation of land by government, emphasis on literal transfer
of title distorts judgment as to what criteria are relevant in deciding whether factual
taking rises to the level of invalid "taking." Where the test should be flexible it is
all but inflexible. Loretto154 was a bad decision for this very reason. Yet Justice
Scalia employs that case as precedent for invalidation of the directive of the Coastal
Commission. "We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred, for
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right
to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even
though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises.' 1 55 Justice Brennan had the better precedent in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins,156 where the "Court made clear" that "physical access to private
property in itself creates no taking problem if it does not 'unreasonably impair the
value or use of [the] property.' "157 Earlier consideration in Section I demonstrates
the unsatisfactoriness of attempting to determine "taking" by reference to the taking
clause.
The second and fundamental difficulty with looking to the taking clause is that
on its face it states only what is to transpire should government wish to proceed with
its program when that program has been held to constitute an unconstitutional taking.
The taking clause does not resolve the question whether or not "taking" has
occurred. It is true that an unsophisticated Court lately has attempted to develop
precedent for that purpose, but if it would heed the genius of Holmes it would see that
from time immemorial it has been due process that has functioned as the test of
"taking." By insisting on a distinction between standards for taking clause
challenges and those for due process challenges, Justice Scalia destroys the potential
for understanding the functional interplay of the two tandem provisions in the fifth
(and fourteenth) amendment for protection of private property.
In the present Term the Court returned to the "taking" issue in Pennell v. City
of San Jose. 158 A rent control ordinance of the city provides that should a landlord
raise the rent of a tenant in possession by more than eight percent, the tenant is
authorized to lay an objection before a hearing officer. In determining whether the
excess is "reasonable under the circumstances" that officer is directed to consider a
number of factors, including "tenant hardship," more particularly defined by the
ordinance as "an unreasonably severe financial or economic hardship on a particular
tenant. ... " If on balance the officer finds such burden, he is empowered to disallow
the entire excess or any portion thereof. A landlord and a landlords' association
153. See note 116 and accompanying text.
154. See note 54 and accompanying text.
155. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987).
156. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
157. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3157 (1987).
158. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
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attacked this provision. Grounds for asserted invalidity were the taking clause, the
due process clause, and the equal protection clause.
On first reaction to the Court's response, due process seemed to have gained in
posture, for both the majority opinion by the Chief Justice and the partial dissent by
Justice Scalia treated due process as relevant to the landlord's claim of invalid taking.
For the first time all the Justices who heard argument acknowledged its pertinency.
It is true that the due process challenge was rejected in both opinions but this was
altogether understandable in the circumstances. Attack had been on the face of the
tenant hardship provision; both majority and dissenters were careful to state only that
the provision was not "facially invalid under the Due Process Clause." '15 9
Measured against the criteria of due process taking examined in Part In of this
critique, "taking" anywhere near approaching constitutional breach is not present.
Landlord and tenant have a long history in the law. While the relationship is close it
is contentious in form; conflicting interests are of the very essence of the association.
Here, however, there has been no alteration of rights to the detriment of the landlord.
There never may be any, but should the future hold this consequence, for the present
it lies in pure speculation. Qualitatively, the mere presence in the ordinance of the
tenant hardship clause, with no indication of what may transpire under it, generates
at most an economic concern for the landlord that lacks any quality of a property
right. Quantitatively viewed the landlord claim is even more flimsy. Magnitude is at
zero; not one strand of a landlord's bundle of property rights has been severed for
transfer to any tenant. Due process is concerned with actuality in legislative or
administrative adjustments of proprietary rights in the here and now. Speculation that
adverse impact may occur at some later time must await a provocative event.
Alas, further attention to the Pennell opinions dashes first hopes of progress in
Court recognition of the part that due process should play under the tutelage of
Holmes. Due process is accorded relevancy only to be deflated to near irrelevancy.
The taking clause is anointed as the controlling judge of whether or not unlawful
taking has transpired. The full Court has now accepted the misguided thesis of Justice
Scalia in Nollan that the "standards for taking challenges" differ from those for "due
process challenges"t16 with the former applicable in determining whether a technical
taking is of a severity to require government to award just compensation as the price
of its exaction.
Justice Scalia, whom Justice O'Connor joined, is more forthright in pedestalling
the taking clause. In the very same paragraph, the opening one of his disagreement,
he asserts that the tenant hardship provision does not of itself run afoul of due process
and yet "effects a taking of private property without compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 161 The position of the majority is not different
on this key point. Their view that the case as presented was not yet ripe for resolution
does not obscure the fact that, should administration of the challenged provision
precipitate a seeming transfer of the landlord's property to a hardship tenant, the
159. Id. at 853 (majority language). The phrasing of the dissent appears id. at 859.
160. Id. at 859.
161. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
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taking issue would be decided under the taking clause. This is clear enough from
several passages in the opinion of the Chief Justice. Instance the opening statement
reciting disposition of the case below by the California courts' 62 and the two
paragraphs that follow immediately his turn to consideration of the merits.1 63
Pennell is a devastating setback to realization of Holmes' propositions that it is
due process which fixes bounds to the police power and determines when "taking"
has gone too far. All the Justices have now undercut the second of his constitutional
premises; the first hangs in the balance by virtue of Justice Brennan's uncertain
support for it in Nollan after earlier championing it with success among a number of
his associates.
Due process is thus far from enjoying the center stage in takings jurisprudence
which the genius of Holmes would accord it. After sixty-six years of repeated
opportunity for comprehension, why do the able minds of sitting Justices fail to
embrace the insight Holmes provided in his seminal opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon? This extended episode is a sad one in the history of an institution
respected for its constitutional statesmanship. When the Court manifests an inability
or unwillingness to master the Constitution as structured, surely it would be utter folly
to allow the Justices an interpretational carte blanche beyond the empowerments and
constrictions of a democratically conceived written instrument of fundamental law.
162. Id. at 853.
163. Id. at 856.
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